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Structuring the Banking Regulators
and Supervisors:
Developed Country Experiences and Their




The 1997 Second High Level Meeting on the Reform of Latin American and
Caribbean Financial Systems (SELA) and its related Proceedings' address a number of
important issues in relation to the reform of Latin American and Caribbean financial sys-
tems. This chapter focuses on the specific issue of the appropriate basic structure(s) for
bank regulators and supervisors.
Various chapters in this compilation consider, in general terms, the structure of a
number of different financial systems, both from Latin America and from developed coun-
tries such as Spain and the United States. While the needs of developed and developing
systems are indeed different, comparative analysis can provide lessons for the further
development of both.
Other chapters touch upon the increasingly important question of regional integra-
tion of banking markets and harmonization of legal and regulatory regimes. While obvi-
ously the European Union is the farthest along in this process to date,2 convergence devel-
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1. This chapter is based on a paper submitted at the Second High Level Meeting on the Reform of
Latin American and Carribean Financial Systems, Caracas Venez. (Oct. 27-28, 1997) [hereinafter
1997 SELA Caracas Conference Proceedings]. LATIN AMERICAN ECONOMIC SYSTEM (SELA).
2. See generally ANDENAS ET AL., EUROPEAN MONETARY UNION: LEGAL AND INSTITUTIONAL ASPECTS
(1997).
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opments in both Mercosur and the NAFTA countries are also progressing.3 In terms of the
Mercosur countries, the experiences of the EU are especially instructive and in many ways
may provide a rough blueprint for the way forward. 4
By way of brief digression, the following should be kept in mind with respect to the
regional integration and regulatory harmonization processes in the banking area in Latin
America:
(a) these processes should fit within and contribute to the broader regional economic
integration objectives of greater liberalization in cross border trade in services
and direct investments. 5 As such, there is an inherent tension that must be recon-
ciled ultimately between the goal of liberalization and the goal of maintaining
safe and sound banking and other financial systems;6
(b) these banking reform processes are highly complex, involving and intersecting
with various national, bilateral, subregional, regional, and hemispheric economic
regimes;
7
(c) whether concerning the banking reform or the broad economic integration
processes, what is involved is not a series of ends, but a series of broad objectives
to play out over time through "ongoing processes"' 8 Yet, in the same context, "time
is of the essence," as modern technology and market realities have an increasingly
accelerating impact on these processes9 and as integration and reform windows
tend to be open only for limited periods;10
(d) the reform and integration processes occurring within Latin America today are
not tools in any North-South conflict, but are part of a dynamic and interactive
framework involving constructive North-South and South-South sustainable
economic development; 11 and
3. See, e.g., INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT LAW SERIES, NAFrA AND BEYOND: A NEW FRAMEWORK
FOR DOING BusINEss IN THE AMERICAS (Joseph J. Norton & Thomas A. Bloodworth eds.,1995).
4. See the contribution of Dr. Eva Holz, 1997 Sela Caracas Conference Proceedings, supra note 1 (on
the Mercosur process).
5. See General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade: Multilateral Trade Negotiations Final Act
Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Trade Negotiations, Apr. 15, 1994, 33 I.L.M.
1125 (1994) [hereinafter GATT Final Act]; General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade: Multilateral
Trade Negotiations General Agreement on Trade in Services, Apr. 15, 1994, 33 I.L.M. 44 (1994)
[hereinafter GATS].
6. Trade Liberalisation and Financial Services, CENTRE FOR COMMERCIAL LAW STUDIES (CCLS),
London (May 30-31, 1997).
7. Latin American and Caribbean Integration Options, 1997 SELA Caracas Conference Proceedings
(Oct. 1997).
8. See, e.g., Holz, 1997 SELA Caracas Conference Proceedings, supra note 4.
9. See id.
10. For example, even though some commentators refer to the European Union integration as an
evolving area over nearly half a century, the reality has been that true integration advancements
have occurred during selective time windows (e.g., 1956-63, 1969-72, and 1986-92).
11. See Colin L. McCarthy, Regional Iniegration of Developing Countries at Different Levels of
Economic Development-Problems and Prospects, 4 TRANSNAT'L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 1 (1994).
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(e) the reform and integration processes are not simply about the creation of sub-
stantive rules, but of creating an environment of deeper and wider regional trans-
parency within the financial market places and the relevant governmental deci-
sion-making processes.12
Still other chapters in this compilation have turned to the question of supervisory
activity. For example, these Proceedings have looked at the question of dealing with dis-
tressed banks. Unfortunately, for many countries, including those of Latin America as well
as the United States, this is a question of continuing importance and moreover, is likely to
remain so. As discussed at a recent conference in London on the topic of banking failures
and bank insolvency law in emerging and transitioning economies, individual bank fail-
ures will never and should (perhaps) never be eliminated completely. 13
In addition, international trends in the area of banking supervision have been dis-
cussed. At the moment, we are seeing a wide variety of international and regional organi-
zations producing various principles and agreements in the area of financial supervision. 14
These developments are significant in that they provide not only an internationally agreed
framework of best practices, but they also create the possibility of further harmonization
and stability for all participants. 15 Regardless, however, of the significance of these achieve-
ments, countries around the world, both developed and developing, are faced with the
most difficult aspect: implementation of these principles in their own banking systems.16
It is within the above-referenced contexts that the topic of this chapter can be elabo-
rated upon; i.e., the question of the basic structure(s) for banking regulators and supervi-
sors. As such, this chapter will attempt to lay out what appears to be the basic issues in
relation to the structuring of a banking supervisor/regulator in developed and developing
economies. Unfortunately, this is an area where there are no clear answers; however, hope-
fully the problems involved can be made a bit clearer. Also, perhaps a few suggestions can
be extended that could be taken into account in any country's individual decision-making
process in regard to the structure of its regulatory authorities.
In terms of basic structural issues, there are three that appear to be of the most signifi-
cance. Each of these will be discussed in tum-placing them in the context of the recent,
Basle Committee Core Principles for Effective Banking Supervision.'7 First, decision-makers
need to address the question of whether banking supervision should be placed under the
ambit of the central bank. Second, given the increasing trend internationally towards uni-
12. See R.M. PECCHIOLI, OECD, PRUDENTIAL SUPERVISION IN BANKING 96-100 (1987).
13. See Proceedings of CCLS/EBRD Research Seminar on Bank Failures and Bank Insolvency Law in
Economies in Transitions, London (Oct. 16-17, 1997).
14. For example, the International Organization of Securities Commissions (IOSCO) and the
International Accounting Standards Committee have emerged as increasingly important multi-
lateral agencies in relation to reconciling and harmonizing the various regulatory regimes exist-
ing alongside one another in today's global financial marketplace.
15. See generally JOSEPH J. NORTON, DEVISING INTERNATIONAL BANK SUPERVISORY STANDARDS, particu-
larly ch. 4 (1995).
16. For discussion as to Mercosur banking systems, see E. Holz, LA INTEGRACIN DES LOS SISTEMAS
BANCARIOS (1997). See also, contribution of E. Aquirre, 1997 Caracas Conference Proceedings,
supra note 1.
17. BASLE COMMITTEE ON BANKING SUPERVISION, CORE PRINCIPLES FOR EFFECTIVE BANKING SUPERVISION
4 (Sept. 1997) [hereinafter BASLE CORE PRINCIPLES].
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versal banking, the question is whether regulation of banks should be taken from an insti-
tutional or a functional basis. Third, there are issues that arise from the increasing promi-
nence of financial conglomerates and from the regulatory structural questions that emerge
as a result-namely whether a single financial regulatory scheme is a logical step in an evo-
lution of regulatory approaches.
After looking at these issues, primarily in the context of developed country experi-
ences, this chapter will then turn to the implications of each for developing countries. In
this regard, despite the differences in needs between developed and developing countries,
the experiences of the developed countries can be instructive. Further, as these experiences
are today being set down in various principles of best practice, the chapter will look at
what some of these may mean for the structure of regulatory and supervisory practices in
developing countries. Finally, this chapter will draw from all of this a few suggestions and
themes that may be of some use to those involved in financial restructuring in Latin
America.
II. The Basle Core Principles for Effective Banking Supervision.
The Basle Core Principles present the basic outline for effective banking supervision
and are intended to serve as a basic reference for supervisory and other public authorities
around the world. Essentially, the Basle Committee has prepared a list of twenty-five basic
principles that should underlie banking supervisory policies and structures. These princi-
ples are then enumerated in a Compendium of existing Basle Committee documents that
are cross-referenced in the Core Principles and are intended to expand upon them and
explain their application. These principles are to be updated periodically, as additional
documents are released. 18
In terms of the twenty-five Core Principles themselves, they are divided into seven sec-
tions: preconditions for effective banking supervision, 19 licensing and structure, 20 pruden-
tial regulations and requirements, 2 1 methods of ongoing banking supervision, 22 informa-
tion requirements, 23 formal powers of supervisors,24 and cross-border banking.25 While
these Principles are very instructive in terms of coverage and issues, they nonetheless must
be implemented by domestic authorities on an individual basis.
On the one hand, the Core Principles are intended to serve as a "basic reference' and
as such, national adaptations and variations in the implementation of the principles are
18. Basle Committee on Banking Supervisions, Compendium of Documents Produced by the Basle
Committee on Banking Supervision (April 1997) (updated) (as referred to in BASLE CORE
PRINCIPLES, supra note 17, at 1).
19. See BASLE CORE PRINCIPLES, supra note 17, Principle 1, at 4.
20. Id. Principles 2-5, at 4.
21. Id. Principles 6-15, at 5-6.
22. Id. Principles 16-20, at 6.
23. Id. Principle 21, at 6-7.
24. Id. Principle 22, at 7.
25. Id. Principles 23-25, at 7.
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contemplated.26 However, on the other hand, the Principles are "minimum requirements"
for "supervisory and other public authorities in all countries and internationally " 27 In
addition, it must be kept in mind that these Core Principles are not the work product of the
exclusive Basle Committee "club" of selective industrialized nations, but they represent the
joint effort of the Basle Committee and non-G-1O supervisory authorities, including key
Latin American authorities. 28
Moreover, it is expected that the Principles will be endorsed by supervisory authorities
throughout the world. 29 For example, in 1998 the Principles will be submitted to the
Association of Banking Supervisory Authorities of Latin America and the Caribbean Bank
Supervisors for their formal endorsement. 30 Further, the Principles must be taken most
seriously by all countries because they "have been designed to be verifiable by supervisors,
regional supervisory groups, and the market at large "'31 In fact, "it is suggested that the
I[nternational] M[onetary] Ffund], the World Bank and other interested organizations use
the Principles in assisting individual countries to strengthen their supervisory arrange-
ments with work aimed at promoting overall macroeconomic and financial stability."32
Also, in all likelihood, substantial compliance with the Principles will be factored into deci-
sions of private rating agencies, private investors, and financial markets themselves.
III. The Role of the Central Bank in Regulation and Supervision
of Banks.
According to the above-mentioned Basle Core Principles, a precondition for effective
banking supervision is, "an effective system of banking supervision that will have clear
responsibilities and objectives for each agency involved in the supervision of banking orga-
nizations."33 This Principle 1, however, does not afford any meaningful insight into the
question of the structure of the relationship between the central bank and the banking
supervisory authorities. In many countries around the world, the functions of the central
bank include banking regulation and supervision; however, many countries separate the
two with equal effectiveness. 34 This section will look at the arguments for and against the
separation of the central bank and the banking supervisory authorities.
26. Id. at 2, para. 6.
27. Id. at 2, paras. 5 & 6.
28. Id. at 1-2, para. 3 (outlining the 16 participating non-G-t0 supervisory authorities (including
Mexico, Argentina, and Brazil)).
29. Id. at 3, para. 7.
30. See oral remarks by Dr. Edgardo Mimica Miranda, Executive Secretary of the Association, at the
SELA Conference upon which these Proceedings are based.
31. See Basle Core Principles, supra note 17, at 2, para. 6.
32. See id.
33. See id. Principle 1, at 4.
34. See C. Goodhart & D. Schoenmaker, Institutional Separation Between Supervisory and Monetary
Agencies, FIN. MARKETS GROUP (Apr. 1993).
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A. ARGUMENTS FOR SEPARATION.
In terms of arguments for the separation of banking supervision from the central
bank, three primary points emerge.
First, there may be a conflict of interest between supervision and monetary policy
objectives. The danger is that in the context of supervising and perhaps supporting the
banking system through, for example, lender of last resort functions, the central bank will
jeopardize its commitment to monetary policy objectives--especially price stability. More
to the point, a central bank that is responsible for (and is subject to public criticism on
account of) banking supervisory activities might have a bias towards injecting extra capital
into the banking system to avert or contain a bank failure. Without delving into the eco-
nomics of monetary policy objectives, it seems an increasing trend internationally is to
place greater (and often sole) emphasis on central bank commitment to monetary objec-
tives, namely price stability, within a framework of independence from political process-
es.35 Including banking supervision within the central bank's catalogue of responsibilities
would run counter to this objective. An area where this can be most clearly seen is in the
situations in developing countries, such as Mexico and Thailand, where the central bank
has actually been forced to abandon stability in the face of threats to the banking system. 36
Second, if price stability is indeed the prime (or sole) objective of the central bank,
then in order to assure credibility for its actions in that regard, it must jealously guard its
reputation in the marketplace. Credibility is seen as vital for effective central bank sup-
port for price stability.3 7 The examples of Germany and the United Kingdom are
instructive in the reputational risk that banking supervisory activities may pose to a cen-
tral bank's credibility. The German Bundesbank has no formal supervisory authority
and has escaped criticism over its role in banking crises in Germany.38 In the United
Kingdom (where central bank and supervisory roles have historically been combined)
the Bank of England's handling of BCCI and Barings has impacted its supervisory repu-
tation adversely.39 The current U.K. Labor Government is now proposing the separation
of supervisory powers from the Bank, though the Government has conceded the Bank's
formal monetary independence.4 0
Third, it is argued that the increasingly diverse nature of financial institutions pre-
vents the central bank from administering adequate supervision. The expertise of the cen-
tral bank, of course, will relate to the areas of finance and economics in banking. As more
35. See Barry Eichengreen, GLOBALIZING CAPITAL (1996).
36. See id.
37. E.g., on Mexico situation, see, e.g., D. Arner, The Mexican Pesos Crisis: Implications for the
Regulation of Financial Markets, 2 NAFTA REv. 4, 28 (1996). On Thailand, see T. Traisorat, The
Thai Financial Crisis of 1997: The Same Old Fundamental Problems Revisited, to appear in Y.B. of
INT'L FIN. & ECON. L. 1997 (forthcoming 1998).
38. See Theodor Baums and Michael Gruson, The German Banking System-System of the Future, 19
BROOK. J. INT'L L. 101 (1993).
39. See generally Joseph J. Norton & Christopher D. Olive, Globalization of Financial Risks and
International Supervision of Banks and Securities Firms: Lessons from the Barings Debacle, 30 INT'L
L. 301 (1996); Richard Dale, Reflections on the BCCI Affair: A United Kingdom Perspective, 26
INT'L LAw. 949 (1992).
40. See infra notes 87-97 and accompanying text.
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and more banks begin to venture out into other areas of the financial market (e.g., securi-
ties investment and insurance), the scope of the central bank's expertise begins to become
relatively inadequate. The argument here is that a multi-faceted banking industry needs to
be mirrored by a multi-faceted banking regulator.
Note, however, that in developing countries, with their lack of experienced financial
personnel and typically small financial systems, this argument may in fact cut the other
way. There may be certain synergies to be gained by placing banking supervision under the
central bank's responsibility in these countries where the scarcity of qualified economists
and financial experts justifies it. Central banks may be able to attract recruits of a higher
quality, if for no other reason than salaries and other benefits that tend to be better for
central bankers than for other public officials. Furthermore, in many developing countries,
the research department of the central bank is often the best (if not the only) policy
research group in the country.4 1
B. ARGUMENTS AGAINST SEPARATION.
There are essentially three fundamental categories of arguments against the separation
of the central bank from banking supervision activities: (i) those relating to the central
bank's lender of last resort function; (ii) those involving the payment systems; and (iii) those
advancing the need for consistency between monetary policy and banking supervision.
First, the central bank is traditionally the lender of last resort in any country's banking
system. In essence, this role involves the provision by the central bank of short-term liq-
uidity at penalty rates of interest to sound banks facing immediate liquidity problems. The
rationale is that the collapse of an otherwise sound bank due to a short-term liquidity cri-
sis may present a threat of contagious risk to other banks and the financial system as a
whole through a failure of confidence inducing systemic bank runs, potentially resulting in
systemic financial collapse. While the merits of all of the various assumptions and theories
that have just been mentioned are of some contention among economists, 42 it is nonethe-
less widely accepted that the central bank plays a vital role in ensuring the liquidity and
stability of the financial system in its role as lender of last resort.
The separation of the central bank from the banking supervisory functions is an effec-
tive separation of the lender of last resort from the information it needs to exercise its
duties. Moreover, the agency placed in charge of banking supervision will inevitably lack
the level of funding needed to effectively avert a problem. Given that lender of last resort
situations develop quickly and must be attended to with as much immediacy as is possible,
this very obviously could pose a problem of considerable importance for both developed
and developing countries alike. 43
Overall, the experiences of Germany are very instructive in this regard. In Germany, as
stated previously, banking supervision is undertaken by an agency external to the
41. R. Lastra, CENTRAL BANKING AND BANKING REGULATION 149 (1996).
42. See Goodhart and Schoenmaker, supra note 34, at 18, referencing, inter alia, Thomas M.
Humphrey and Robert E. Keleher, The Lender of Last Resort: A Historical Perspective, 4 CATO J.,
275-318 (Spring / Summer 1984).
43. R. Lastra, Lender of Last Resort, Paper Presented on October 16, 1997 at a Seminar on Bank
Failures and Bank Insolvency Law in Economies of Transition, supra, note 13.
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Bundesbank, the German central bank. However, in the German system, all supervisory
information passes through the Bundesbank before going to the supervisory authority,
which is conveniently located in the same building (supervision is actually undertaken by a
system of external auditors who report to both the supervisors and the central bank,
although actual supervisory functions are not undertaken by the Bundesbank). 44
The German system has two implications for supervisory structures. First, regardless
of whether a formal separation exists between the central bank and the supervisory
authorities, a system must exist whereby the central bank has immediate access to all
supervisory information in order to allow it to perform its role as lender of last resort.
Second, in a universal banking system such as Germany's where most financial assets do in
fact flow through the banking system, information is much more readily available to the
central bank in regard to both its monetary policy and its lender of last resort roles.
Related to the problem of lender of last resort functions, central banks also tradition-
ally provide emergency support to the payments system within a country.45 This is due to
what is typically referred to as Herstatt risk, following the failure of Bankhaus Herstatt in
1974.46 Essentially, the problem is that in any system without a real-time payment system,
if a major bank fails before it pays on all matched contracts with other financial institu-
tions, the financial system faces the threat of systemic collapse due to a chain of payments
failure to other financial institutions within the system. As with lender of last resort func-
tions, a supervisory agency separate from the central bank will not have sufficient funds to
provide the necessary support until the chain of payments problem is resolved, and this
situation requires action on very short notice and must be dealt with through provision of
constant information to the central bank.
The final argument against the separation of the central bank from banking supervi-
sory functions is that there is a need for consistency between monetary policy and banking
supervision. The argument posits that those devising monetary policy must have a com-
prehensive and intimate understanding of the workings of the banking system, and that
the optimal method of gaining such an understanding is through a direct supervisory role
over the banking sector.
47
C. COMPARATIVE STRUCTURES.
Essentially three traditions exist internationally in regard to the issue of separation of
central banking and banking supervision: non-separation, separation, and non-rule-based,
which are reflected in the United States, Germany, and the United Kingdom respectively.
Ironically, in the United States, the Federal Reserve Board historically was to act as a
decentralized central bank with limited bank supervisory powers. The Board retained
residually direct supervision over only state-chartered banks that were members of the
Federal Reserve System; the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency was to be the pri-
44. See generally Baums and Gruson, supra note 38.
45. See Goodhart and Schoenmaker, supra note 34, at 12.
46. See RICHARD DALE, THE REGULATION OF INTERNATIONAL BANKING 156-67 (1984). See also BIS,
SETTLEMENT RISK IN FOREIGN EXCHANGE TRANSACTIONS (1996).
47. R. Lastra, supra note 41, at 149.
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mary supervisor for the national banks.48 However, with the granting to the Board in 1956
of direct supervisory powers over bank holding companies (which now is the primary
structure for banking organizations) 49 and with the solidification in 1991 of supervisory
powers over foreign banks operating in the United States,50 the Board has become (in real-
ity) a dominant "bank" supervisor in the United States. Thus, in the United States, mone-
tary responsibility has become "grafted onto" and intimately related to the process of
banking supervision and the insurance of a safe and sound financial system. In many ways,
this can be seen as the result of the multiple and disparate objectives legislatively given to
the Federal Reserve by the U.S. Congress (e.g., also supervision over Federal Reserve
System functions and over consumer-related financial matters, as well as supervision over
bank holding companies and foreign banks). 51
In Germany, the central bank and the banking supervisory agency are formally sepa-
rated; although defacto, the two are very closely connected. Nonetheless, the central bank
has no direct powers of supervision or enforcement. This is based on the idea that price
stability is the sole goal of the central bank, and that supervision should neither detract
from that goal nor potentially impair the credibility of the central bank in its pursuit of
price stability. Once again, in many ways this can be seen as the result of the Bundesbank's
singular mandate to pursue price stability, a mandate that is not diluted by the require-
ment to seek other objectives within the financial system. 52
As to a non-rule-based system, in the United Kingdom, historically, there was no legal
basis for the activities of the Bank of England, either in regard to central bank functions or
supervisory issues. Rather, the English banking system was managed as a small gentlemen's
club of bankers through the practice of "moral suasion." In many ways, this can be seen as
a system that was largely sui generis to the peculiarities of the London financial markets
(although a similar system was in effect in Hong Kong for most of its existence under
British rule) that have now ceased to exist. The historical English system represented essen-
tially a laissezfaire, free market system, based on the Bank's practical powers of "moral sua-
sion.' Significant changes in the institutional composition of the London financial mar-
kets, the development of the EC single market, and certain financial scandals have led to
the restructuring and greater legal formalization of this historical system. 53
48. On the complex and fragmented U.S. bank regulatory and supervisory system, see generally,
JOSEPH J. NORTON and S. WHITLEY, BANKING LAw MANUAL (1996).
49. See U.S. Banking Holding Company Act of 1956 (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. § 1841-1850
(1994)).
50. See U.S. Foreign Bank Supervision Enhancement Act of 1991, comprising Title II of the Federal
Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-242, 105 Stat. 2236
(codified in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.). See also DANIEL B. GAIL ET AL., The Foreign Bank
Supervision Act of 1991; Expanding the Umbrella of "Supervisory Regulation," 26 INT'L LAw. 993
(1992).
51. See Norton & Whitley, supra note 48.
52. See Baums and Gruson, supra note 38, at 121.
53. See Joseph J. Norton, The Bank of England's Lament: The Struggle to Maintain the Traditional
Practice of Moral Suasion, in BANK REGULATION AND SUPERVISION IN THE 1990S (Joseph J. Norton
ed., 1992).
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Where does that leave one then? Overall, the issues involved in the question of separa-
tion between the central bank and banking supervision are not capable of simple solution.
Nonetheless, both the separation and the non-separation models seem valid, if they are
properly structured. However, the indistinct model practiced traditionally in the United
Kingdom and in Japan 54 does not seem to be a workable solution, especially in the context
of an emerging economy, as discussed later. As stated in Core Principle 1, clear responsibili-
ties, objectives, operational independence, and adequate resources are the essential quali-
ties to be sought. 55
IV. "Functional" versus "Institutional" Regulation.
For more than a decade, traditional banking practice has been undergoing a dramatic
change: large non-bank institutions (including securities firms and finance companies)
and insurance companies have become major players in the area of traditional banking
activities, forcing banks to expand their range of financial activities into the other previ-
ously segmented industries. In the interests of competition, in the 1990s international
banks have significantly expanded the scope of their activities into areas that directly
impact and/or reallocate credit risk and expose them to differentiating types of risk not
previously within the supervisory "crosshairs" of financial regulators. The end result is that
particular types of risk are no longer confined to specific institutional categories. 56
Regarding, for instance, the securities activities of international banks, the securities
markets have undergone tremendous changes, accelerated by increasingly sophisticated
trading and risk management systems, and by derivative products that serve to unbundle
and to redistribute risks from instruments or transactions. International banks are becom-
ing involved to a heightened extent (as both dealers and proprietary traders) in the inter-
national swaps and over-the-counter (OTC) derivatives markets. In turn, derivative instru-
ments are inducing modifications to the regulation of international bank exposure to
credit risk.5 7 For example, the 1988 Capital Accord has been amended to accommodate
bilateral netting arrangements for off-balance sheet (OBS) activities into capital adequacy
requirements. In April 1995, the Basle Committee issued a final report that both amended
the 1988 Capital Accord and revised a previous July 1994 report to facilitate the regulatory
acceptance of bilateral netting arrangements for the purpose of reducing credit risk among
counterparties and further recognizing such arrangements for purposes of credit risk-
based capital requirements in OBS items.58
54. See, e.g., Maximilian J.B. Hall, BANKING REGULATION AND SUPERVISION: A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF
THE UK, USA AND JAPAN (1993).
55. Basle Core Principles, supra note 17, Principle 1, at 4.
56. See Joseph J. Norton and Christopher D. Olive, The Ongoing Process of International Regulatory
and Supervisory Convergence: A New Regulatory-Market Partnership, 16 ANN. REv. BANKING L. 227
(1997).
57. Id. at 232.
58. See Basle Committee, Basle Capital Accord: Treatment of Potential Exposure for Off-Balance Sheet
Items (Apr. 1995) [hereinafter the "Capital Accord Amendment"]. Legal recognition of netting
arrangements is crucial because the credit exposure of a bank trading in derivatives is mitigated
through bilateral netting with counterparties, and incorporation of netting arrangements into the
credit risk-based capital standards facilitates the desire of banks to engage in such arrangements.
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With the expansion of activities of international banks beyond the confines of what
could be termed "traditional," countries have begun to consider whether their financial
regulatory structures, which were formulated in a seemingly outdated era, are still ade-
quate (if not relevant) in today's financial marketplace. Modern debates in the United
States over the reform of the Glass-Steagall Act have more often than not involved a dis-
cussion over "functional" versus "institutional" regulation.5 9 Without delving into a dis-
cussion on the comprehensiveness of the functional/institutional dichotomy, a preliminary
analysis can serve as a good springboard for a discussion of financial regulatory reform.
In the simplest of terms, institutional regulation places the supervision of certain insti-
tutions under the charge of a specified regulator or regulators. For instance, under this theo-
ry banks would be regulated by a specified banking agency, securities firms would be regulat-
ed by a specified securities agency, and insurance companies would be regulated by a speci-
fied insurance agency. This has been the historic method of financial regulation.60 A simple
and straightforward approach, this theory fails to comport with modern realities that
involve, as mentioned, banks engaging in securities and insurance activities. A prime exam-
ple of the discrepancies in regulation that occur with institutional-based supervision was
highlighted by SEC Chairman Arthur Levitt during his testimony in 1994 before the U.S.
Congress in the Securities Regulatory Equality Hearings. Chairman Levitt cited as a justifica-
tion for the implementation of a more functional regulatory approach the prevailing law that
generally excluded the securities brokerage or advisory activities of banks from the federal
securities laws. Because of this provision, there was an inconsistency between the regulation
of unregistered banks and securities firms, with investors receiving disparate standards of
protection depending upon which institution with which they did their securities business.6 1
Functional regulation has been seen as an alternative approach. This theory separates
regulatory responsibilities among agencies according to common activities or products,
"so that financial products, services and markets delivering similar benefits and risks can
be subjected to substantially equivalent regulation and so that economic competition,
rather than jurisdictional barriers or differences in supervision, can determine which
products, services and markets succeed in the marketplace.' 62 In other words, functional
regulation postulates that similar functions should be regulated similarly. Accordingly,
banking activities would be regulated by a banking agency, securities activities would be
regulated by a securities agency, and insurance activities would be regulated by an insur-
59. See, e.g., Melanie L. Fein, Functional Regulation: A Concept For Glass-Steagall Reform?, 2 STAN. J. L.
Bus. & FIN. 89 (1995).
60. Roberta S. Karmel, Functional Regulation, 501 PRACTICING LAw INST./CORP 9,9 (1985).
61. Securities Regulatory Equality: Hearings on H.R. 3447 Before the Subcomm. on Telecommunication
and Finance of the House Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 103d Cong. 30 (1994).
62.. Chicago Mercantile Exchange, MODEL FOR FEDERAL FINANcIAL REGULATION 2 (1993). In the pro-
posal by the Chicago Mercantile Exchange (CME) for the restructuring of the federal financial
regulation regime, a consolidation was proposed that would envelop the Securities and Exchange
Commission, the Commodities Futures Trading Commission, the Office of the Comptroller of
the Currency (OCC), the Office of Thrift Supervision (OTS), the Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation (FDIC), and the Securities Investor Protection Corporation (SIPC), in addition to
parts of the Department of Labor and the Federal Reserve Board. See John C. Coffee, Jr.,
Competition Versus Consolidation: The Significance of Organizational Structure in Financial and
Securities Regulation, 50 Bus. LAw. 447, 451 (1995).
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ance regulator. The advantages of this approach to regulation have long been recognized.
For instance, the 1984 Report of the Task Group on Regulation of Financial Services
(chaired by then Vice-President George Bush) stated:
[F]unctional regulation can serve the public interest by reducing duplication
among different government agencies and by promoting equal regulation of
competing activities by different types of financial firms. By making regula-
tion "transparent" as to the type of firm involved, functional regulation helps
promote the availability of the widest possible range of financial products for
the public at the lowest possible cost, with different firms prospering or failing
to the greatest degree possible on their efficiency and merits rather than
because of arbitrary differences in government regulation.63
Even though functional regulation promises to promote, inter alia, reduced duplication
among regulators and increased fairness for regulated activities, it harbors serious short-
comings that render it problematic and prevent it from being incorporated wholesale as a
modus operandi of financial marketplace supervision. First, Federal Reserve Chairman
Alan Greenspan has argued that functions, much like institutions, are becoming increas-
ingly difficult to distinguish.64 As the business of finance becomes ever more intertwined,
the meshing of functional distinctions could make functional regulation as obsolete as
strict institutional regulation seems to have become. Furthermore, in relation to financial
conglomerates, functional regulation would have the effect of (i) subjecting these institu-
tions to multiple regulators, thereby increasing their cost of compliance and (ii) preventing
any single regulator from gaining a "full picture" of the institution and its operations,
which would have the potential effect of allowing certain regulatory issues to "fall between
the cracks." As a result, functional regulation cannot exclusively provide an adequate, effi-
cient or even feasible method of supervision for these entities. 65
Once again, the Basle Core Principles do not provide essential guidance in this area,
but in terms of prudential regulations and requirements, they lay down the traditional
Basle focus on capital adequacy, with the proviso that "such requirements should reflect
the risks that banks undertake."66 Accordingly, what is needed is a method that would
allow a fusion of the two regulatory approaches (i.e., institutional and functional). In other
words, effective regulation of today's financial marketplace may require a combined
approach that would allow the benefits of each respective approach to merge. It is within
this context that the concept of a single financial services regulator gains importance, as
discussed below.
Within this overall debate of institutional versus functional regulation lies the issue as to
what role "private actors" should play in the overall regulatory process.67 Key here is the future
63. Blueprint for Reform: The Report of the Task Group on Regulation of Financial Services, reprint-
ed in 1050 FED. BANKING L. REP. (CCH) (Nov. 16, 1984).
64. Alan Greenspan, Remarks at the Conference on Bank Structure and Competition of the Federal
Reserve Bank of Chicago (May 1, 1997) (available in WESTLAw at 1997 WL 217630).
65. See Karmel, supra note 60, at 12.
66. See Basle Core Principles, supra note 17, Principle 6, at 5.
67. See generally Norton and Olive, supra note 56.
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role of the banking and financial services industries themselves in devising, implementing,
and monitoring effective internal risk management systems 68 and the role of independent
auditors in providing oversight and greater accountability in the supervisory processes.69
V. The Single "Mega" Regulator for the Financial Marketplace.
The recent history of the financial marketplace is marked by a revolution of sorts in the
manner in which financial services are being provided. Regulatory deregulation and techno-
logical innovation have ushered in a transformation that has resulted in the relative destruc-
tion of the traditional strict demarcation between commercial and investment banking busi-
ness:70 Exemplary of this shift is the emergence of the financial conglomerate.
As defined by the Tripartite Group of banking, securities, and insurance regulators, a
financial conglomerate can be defined as "any group of companies under common control
whose exclusive or predominant activities consist of providing significant services in at
least two different financial sectors (banking, securities, insurance)." 71 This definition easi-
ly lends itself to the realization that a traditional regulatory approach based on an institu-
tional basis will not suffice for the purposes of proper prudential supervision.
Perhaps it is appropriate to examine why such financial conglomerates have emerged. If
for nothing else, this explanation is necessary to discover the answer to what could be a pri-
mary question, namely: should we allow such business amalgamations to form in the first
place? The financial conglomerate structure is important because it allows significant
improvements in terms of operational efficiency and effectiveness. These benefits are driven
by economies of scope and scale, which generate lower costs, reduced prices, and improved
product and service innovation. The general competitiveness of the business can also be
heightened through sector synergies. By diversifying revenues and risks, the separate business
components, as well as the conglomerate as a whole, can also be improved. Finally, by pro-
moting product variety and innovation, the conglomerate structure can achieve increased
customer loyalty as well as market penetration and market development. 72
Additionally, one must consider the impact of globalization on the provision of financial
services. Under the universal banking theory, whose most well-known disciple is probably
Germany, there are no Glass-Steagall-type distinctions between commercial and investment
banking businesses. 73 Further, in those states with traditional, formal separation between
banking and securities activities (e.g., the United States and Japan), such divisions are break-
ing down with remarkable speed.74 As the global marketplace develops, regulatory edicts
68. See T. Padoa-Schioppa, Globalization of Risks: Cooperation Between Banking and Market
Regulators, in Public Docs. of the XXth IOSCO Annual Conference, Tome I, No. 24, 63-64
(1995).
69. See C. Hadjiemmanuil, BANKING REGULATION AND THE BANK OF ENGLAND 165-173 (1996).
70. For a good discussion of problems arising in connection with conglomerates, see George A.
Walker, The Law of Financial Conglomerates: The Next Generation, 30 IlNr'L LAw. 57 (1996).
71. Report of the Tripartite Group of Banking, Securities and Insurance Regulators, The Supervision
of Financial Conglomerates (July 1995) [hereinafter The Tripartite Report].
72. Walker, supra note 70, at 63.
73. On universal banking, see, for example (Anthony Saunders & Ingo Walter eds., 1996) UNIVERSAL
BANKING: FINANcIAL SYSTEM DESIGN REcONSIDERED.
74. See Norton and Olive, supra note 56.
18 NAFTA: Law and Business Review of the Americas
demanding the maintenance of such distinctions are becoming increasingly obsolete, with the
end result being that some form of reformation has been necessary to allow the financial insti-
tutions in countries with such regulatory approaches to compete on an even footing with
those institutions who are constituents of a universal banking regulatory regime.
Accordingly, it is argued that the benefits of the financial conglomerate structure (e.g.,
financial sector efficiency, innovation, and customer satisfaction) demand that it repre-
sents a development that at the very least should not be discouraged. With this said, regu-
lators must also come to terms with the new, nontraditional risks that are accompanying
financial conglomerates into the marketplace.
In its report on the supervision of financial conglomerates, the Tripartite Group of
banking, securities, and insurance regulators addressed certain issues of concern character-
istic of the conglomerate structure. 75 Though the Group discussed concerns revolving
around, inter alia, transparency, managerial fitness, and conflicts of interest, perhaps the
most important issues addressed related to contagion and additional financial exposures
engendered by this business form. Without delving into detail, there is a question whether
traditional regulatory techniques can adequately address. the combinations of separate
market risks involved with banking, securities, and insurance activities and the dependen-
cies created among these activities when they are combined in a conglomerate structure, as
well as whether the existing regulatory structures can prevent inter-activity or inter-market
contagion (actual or psychological) 76 within these modern conglomerate purveyors of the
financial marketplace.
In addition to the increased (or different) risks to the financial system posed by con-
glomerates, regulators must also ask themselves whether these institutions can be super-
vised fairly and effectively under their existing regulatory regimes. More to the point, tra-
ditional regulatory theories, formulated when banks engaged exclusively in "banking"
business, securities firms practiced only "securities" business, and insurance companies
were the sole providers of private insurance, simply may not be able to accommodate these
conglomerates that house men and women wearing the hats of all of these different pro-
fessions. In short, it is time to ponder whether the structure of financial regulation should
evolve to reflect the conglomerate form of financial services providers.
'In very general terms, under a single financial regulator scheme the individual regula-
tors of banks, securities firms, and insurance companies would be combined into a single
"mega" regulator that would have the sole responsibility for supervising the entirety of the
financial marketplace. The concept is by no means novel, as several countries, notably in
Scandinavia, have implemented such a scheme. As with any other regulatory approach, the
regulation by a single umbrella agency has its advantages and disadvantages. The umbrella
approach is also being pushed actively in the United States by the Federal Reserve. 77
75. The Tripartite Report, supra note 71.
76. As defined by The Tripartite Report, "psychological contagion" is "where problems in one part of
a group are transferred to other parts by market reluctance to deal with a tainted group." The
Tripartite Report, supra note 71, at 18.
77. See e.g., recent speech by W.J. McDonough, President of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, to
the Institute of International Bankers (Sept. 19, 1997). His views echo those expressed earlier in
the year before the Congressional Banking Committee by Mr. Alan Greenspan, Chairman of the
Federal Reserve Board. Alan Greenspan, Statement Before the Committee on Banking and
Financial Services, U.S. House of Representatives (Mar. 19, 1997).
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In a recent publication, Professor Charles Goodhart of the London School of
Economics listed the arguments for and against such an approach. For the purposes of this
chapter, the following subsections will proceed along the lines of Professor Goodhart's
analysis, with elaboration by this author.78
A. THE ADVANTAGES OF A SINGLE REGULATOR.
1. Economies of Scale and Scope.
As with the financial conglomerates themselves, there might be economies of scale to
be realized from the combination of regulatory efforts. Notably, a single financial regulator
may be able to make more efficient use of resources, personnel, and expertise than various
individual regulators by pooling all the efforts into one. Likewise, a single regulator might
be able to employ synergies amongst the various functional regulators to achieve some sort
of economy of scope.
Perhaps the best area in which to view these gains in efficiency is with enforcement.
Rather than having multiple enforcement agents pursuing the same individual or group of
individuals on different, but related offenses committed across the spectrum of financial
activities, the efforts could be consolidated, with a single enforcement agency pursuing the
violator(s) without a duplication of effort and with more of a sense of coherence or fluidity.
2. Simplicity of Regulatory Structure.
Any confusion that arises due to a multitude of regulators would be alleviated by
appointing a single agency to be in charge of supervising the whole of the financial mar-
ketplace. This has special importance in relation to financial conglomerates, who, with a
single regulator in place, would have little trouble in discerning who to report to regardless
of the activity in which it was engaged.
3. Reduced Costs of Compliance.
Related to the point above, a single regulator scheme would limit the costs of compli--
ance for those institutions that were active across the financial services spectrum. Financial
conglomerates with banking, securities, and/or insurance businesses would no longer have
to bear the expense of dealing with a multitude of different regulators.
4. "Mirrored" Regulation.
To the extent that financial institutions have, for lack of a better word, "evolved" into
conglomerate structures offering products and services in a number of different areas,
there may be some advantages to be realized from reformulating the regulatory structure
to mirror these changes. By growing into an umbrella regulator, this agency may be able to
better monitor the activities of financial conglomerates vis-A-vis its one-on-one type of
relationship with those it regulates.
78. See generally C. Goodhart et al., FINANCIAL REGULATION, ch. 8 (forthcoming 1998).
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As recognized by Michael Taylor, banks are no longer the only institutions to be
regarded as systemically important:
[I]n contrast to securities houses' traditional investments, derivatives contracts are
not highly liquid and may be difficult to unwind in an insolvency. Thus the failure
of a securities house which is a major pliyer in these markets may itself be the
cause of systemic risk through disruption of the payments system.... Insurance
companies are now also moving into the OTC ["over the counter"] derivatives
markets-with similar potential for systemic disruption resulting from the failure
of a company which has become a major player in these markets.79
5. Creation of a More Sound Net of Regulation.
A single regulatory agency would seemingly cure problems inherent in a system with
multiple regulators, which could give rise to incomplete or unequal treatment of regulated
entities. Examples of such problems include: (i) inconsistent regulation; (ii) over- and
underlay of regulatory coverage where the lines of supervisory responsibility are not clear-
ly demarcated; and (iii) competition among regulators, which could lead to the classic
race to the bottom" scenario and/or regulatory arbitrage.
6. Most Efficient Use of Regulatory Expertise.
By limiting the number of different regulators and concentrating the regulatory focus,
there may be advantages in markets in which there is a dearth of regulatory expertise.
7. Accountability.
With a single regulator in place, accountability for regulatory actions would be in little
doubt as the question of the responsible agency would never seriously come into play.
B. DISADVANTAGES OF A SINGLE REGULATOR.
The adoption of a single regulator scheme is not without certain problems, which may
or may not outweigh the advantages such a structure would offer.
1. Failure to Appreciate Remaining Differences Among Institutions.
Despite the blurring of the distinctions between banking, securities, and insurance
businesses, and the increased proclivity for financial institutions to dabble in activities
across the financial services spectrum, major differences still exist among financial institu-
tions. For example, even though a bank is conducting some securities business, its core
business will continue to be banking. If ever, it will be some time before there is an institu-
tion which places an equal importance upon its different financial activities. The point
here is that differences will continue to remain between the risks inherent in the businesses
of what have traditionally been termed "banks," "securities firms" and "insurance compa-
nies" thereby justifying a differentiated approach to prudential regulation.
79. Michael Taylor, "Twin Peaks": A Regulatory Structure for the New Century, CENTRE FOR THE STUDY
OF FINANcIAL INNOVATION, at 4 (1995).
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2. Excessive Power and/or Bureaucracy.
There is a possibility that a regulator with complete oversight of the financial market-
place could become a bullying, bureaucratic monolith with considerable power at its dis-
posal. In a speech on March 22, 1997, Federal Reserve Chairman Alan Greenspan noted
the dichotomy between effective supervision and systemic protection on the one hand and
the latitude for banks to conduct essential risk-taking on the other. In Chairman
Greenspan's view, there is a level of "optimal risk-taking" that must be allowed to take
place in the marketplace in order for there to be the innovation necessary to maintain a
healthy and expanding financial sector. Overbearing supervision of the sector would have
a stifling effect on the freedom of institutions to take risks and perhaps, fail. In his words:
The key to protecting against overzealousness in regulation is for banks to
have a choice of more than one federal regulator. With two or more federal
regulators, a bank can choose to change its charter thereby choosing to be
supervised by another federal regulator. That possibility has served as a con-
straint on arbitrary and capricious policies at the federal level. True, it is pos-
sible that two or more federal agencies can engage in a competition in laxi-
ty-but I worry considerably more about the possibility that a single federal
regulator would become inevitably rigid and insensitive to the needs of the
marketplace. So long as the existence of a federal guarantee of deposits and
other elements of the safety net call for federal regulation of banks, regulation
should entail a choice of federal regulator in order to ensure the critical com-
petitiveness of our banks.80
This statement by Chairman Greenspan highlights not only the problem of an "overzeal-
ous regulator" but also the merit in having a competitive regulatory environment.
3. Loss of Regulatory Competition.
Related to the point above, by combining the financial regulators into a single agency,
there is a risk that there will be a loss of diversity and competitive spirit that will lead to a
stagnation of the regulatory environment. In other words, with a unilateral approach
towards financial supervision, regulators would be unable to learn from the lessons of
other regulators--other than from a historical perspective.
An easy example is the introduction of money market accounts by brokerage firms in
the early 1970s in the United States. With the maximum interest rates chargeable by com-
mercial and savings banks limited by Regulation Q, the brokerage firms were able to carve
out a niche of the deposit market for themselves-at the expense of the banks. The argu-
ment is that a single mega regulator could have banned such brokerage firm accounts
because they constituted a threat to the banking industry, thereby hindering the innova-
tion and competitiveness of the marketplace.8 1
80. Alan Greenspan, Remarks at the Annual Convention of the Independent Bankers Association of
America (Mar. 22, 1997).
81. See Coffee, supra note 62, at 456.
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4. Communication and Cooperation Is Not Sure to Improve.
Even though regulators would all be under one roof, it is not a foregone conclusion
that the supervisors responsible for the different functional areas of regulation would com-
municate any better or coordinate their activities to any greater extent.
5. Likelihood of Cultural Conflicts Arising Within the Single Regulator.
If a single agency was given the responsibility for all aspects of regulation (systemic,
prudential, and conduct of business), it is likely that it would result in an unmanageable
aggregation of interests. At the very least, it would seem that such an agency would have
some difficulty in focusing, with its objectives being so diffuse.
Michael Taylor has identified two main public policy objectives in the regulation of
financial services, namely:
(i) ensuring the stability and soundness of the financial system (systemic protec-
tion), and
(ii) protecting individual depositors, investors, and policy holders to the extent that
they cannot be reasonably expected to protect themselves (consumer protection).8 2
Interestingly, Taylor posits that it is unacceptable to have conflicts between these objectives
internalized within a super-regulatory structure, as resolutions of such conflicts are inher-
ently of a public policy nature, and therefore, should be taken at a political level.8 3
6. Potential Moral Hazard.
The public could become confused with which functions of the financial institutions
are insured and those that are not. Specifically, the public could come to assume that the
single financial regulator extends its umbrella of deposit protection over the entirety of the
financial services it supervises.
7. Question as to Whether Economies of Scale Are Attainable.
It cannot be taken as a truth.that the bigger size of the single regulator would translate
into more efficiency in its operations. This agency would be existing as a regulatory
monopoly, and it is possible that X-inefficiencies or diseconomies of scale could arise.
C. THE ROLE OF THE CENTRAL BANK WITHIN A SINGLE REGULATOR STRUCTURE.
A question that needs to be addressed in relation to the adoption of a single financial
regulator scheme is what to do with the central bank. In many countries the central bank has
been traditionally responsible for bank supervision, in addition to its quintessential role as
monetary authority. Upon the restructuring of a financial regulation scheme into a single
agency, it must be decided whether to incorporate the central bank into the structure.
Importantly, recent restructuring efforts in Australia and the United Kingdom have notably
excluded the central bank from their conceptions of a single financial services regulator.
82. TAYLOR, supra note 79, at 2.
83. Id. at 15.
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A number of issues present themselves in relation to the role of the central bank with-
in the single regulator structure. None, however, is more important than the issue of how
the central bank's role as lender of last resort is integrated into a single regulator structure
in which it has no supervisory powers. This issue is framed in relation to the discussion of
the separation of the central bank from the responsibilities of banking supervision, as dis-
cussed in the first part of this paper.84
Outlined by the Wallis Committee Report in Australia 85 and the Labour
Government's plans in the United Kingdom,86 the intention is to detach the central bank
from the single financial supervisory structure. Though the respective central banks will
retain the responsibility for financial system stability generally, including a lender of last
resort role, neither will be involved in the supervision and regulation of the financial inter-
mediaries within the system. As a result, these central banks will no longer have direct
access to the information provided through supervision regarding the health of the indi-
vidual banks, as well as the system as a whole, while having to reach (and fund) the deci-
sions of whether and how to implement necessary rescue operations. The obvious ques-
tion is: how is a central bank supposed to make, in the relative sliver of time that such
emergency situations dictate, such conclusions that could very well be of heightened sys-
temic importance? The answer must be that the central bank is afforded a direct and com-
prehensive line of communication with the single regulator.
The German model, as briefly discussed earlier, could serve as a viable example of how
such information could be provided, whereby all information that is gathered via superviso-
ry examinations is filtered through the Bundesbank-even though it lacks any explicit super-
visory powers. This model illuminates an interesting point. Many of the arguments against
the separation of the central bank from the supervisory functions hinge on the interrelation
of the supervisory powers and the central bank's monetary and prudential role.
This author advances that it is not the supervisory powers themselves that the central
bank is in need of, but rather, the information which such powers yield. If a proper mecha-
nism is established that will allow the central bank to distill the information from the
supervision conducted by another entity, then the argument that the central bank cannot
properly function without supervisory powers seems to lose much of its thrust-as does
the argument against a single financial regulator detached from the corpus of the central
bank. With that said, it is essential that there are lines of timely communication set up
between the central bank and the single financial regulator to allow the central bank to
adequately discharge its duties as general overseer of the financial system-including its
lender of last resort function.
84. See supra notes 33-47 and accompanying text.
85. Committee of Inquiry into the Australian Financial System, Financial System Inquiry Final Report(Mar. 1997) (Wallis Report).
86. See UK SECURITIES AND INVESTMENTS BOARD, REPORT TO THE CHANCELLOR OF THE EXCHEQUER ON
THE REFORM OF THE FINANCIAL REGULATORY SYSTEM (July 1997) [hereinafter REPORT TO THE
CHANCELLOR].
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D. RECENT FINANCIAL REGULATORY REFORM IN THE UNITED KINGDOM NEwRO:
THE CASE FOR A SINGLE FINANCIAL REGULATOR.
The viability (if not favorability) of a single financial regulator scheme is becoming
increasingly more accepted in markets across the globe. The Scandinavian countries of
Denmark, Norway, and Sweden have in place a combined banking, securities, and insur-
ance regulator. Furthermore, as mentioned above, Australia and the United Kingdom have
indicated their plans to place their respective financial regulatory schemes under the
supervision of a single umbrella regulator. Both of the latter cases could be instructive for
countries (developed and developing alike) considering a restructuring of their financial
regulatory system. For the purposes of this subsection, the author will briefly address the
changes that are underway in the United Kingdom.
The financial market in the United Kingdom (i.e., London) is undoubtedly one of the
world's biggest and most important. Long on experience and steeped in history, this mar-
ket currently employs 600,000 persons in various capacities. 8 7 To have such a venerable
institution subjected to the changes that single agency regulation will usher in is important
in and of itself. Indeed, the fact that the new Labor Government felt that such a change was
needed to maintain the United Kingdom's market position of importance is perhaps
telling of the shape that financial regulation is to take in the future.
In May 1997, soon after the Labor Party assumed control of the government, it
announced that the financial regulation regime in the United Kingdom was to be restruc-
tured. 88 Traditionally fragmented into operational areas, financial regulation in the United
Kingdom will undergo a consolidation, with a new single regulatory agency supervising
the whole of the British financial market. In the Report to the Chancellor on the Reform of
the Financial Regulatory System,8 9 the basic framework of the changes was laid out. The
following discussion will proceed on the assumption that the government will proceed, at
least generally, along the lines of this report.
When finally implemented (in all likelihood not before the turn of the millennium),
financial regulation in the United Kingdom will be conducted under the auspices of a sin-
gle statutory agency. Referred to in the Report as "NewRO" (and elsewhere as the "Super
SIB"), this single regulator will incorporate the regulatory functions of nine different bod-
ies, namely:90
(1) Building Societies Commission (BSC);
(2) Friendly Societies Commission (FSC);
(3) Insurance Directorate of the Department of Trade
and Industry (DTI);
(4) Investment Management Regulatory Organization (IMRO);
87. Michael Cassidy, Declaration of Interest, FIN. TIMES, Feb. 19, 1997, at 22. "Financial services pro-
duce GBP 20bn a year in net overseas earnings and are as important to the UK economy as man-
ufacturing.' Id.
88. See George Jones and Richard Northedge, 'Super' Watchdog for City in New Shake-up, DAILY
TELEGRAPH (London), May 21, 1997, at 1; George Graham, Bank to Lose Supervisory Role, FIN.
TIMES, May 21, 1997, at 1.
89. REPORT TO THE CHANCELLOR, supra note 86.
90. On October 28, 1997 (subsequent to the drafting of this chapter), the Labour Government
announced the name for the new financial regulator will be The Financial Services Authority
(FSA). However, for the purposes of this chapter, references to the new regulator will be to
"NewRO"
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(5) Personal Investment Authority (PIA);
(6) Registry of Friendly Societies (RFS);
(7) Securities and Futures Authority (SFA);
(8) Securities and Investment Board (SIB); and
(9) Supervision and Surveillance Division of the Bank of England.
By combining these individual regulators into a single agency, the United Kingdom
hopes to realize the benefits of (i) more coordinated and consistent regulation; (ii) simpli-
fied access for those who need to deal with it; (iii) simpler and clearer lines of regulatory
accountability; and (iv) greater efficiency of operations, including economies of scale. 91 In
addition, appreciating that there may be potential disadvantages to regulating its financial
markets through a single agency, the United Kingdom will implement measures to com-
pensate. For example, arrangements are to be made to allow for a "flexible and differentiat-
ed" regulatory approach that will better accommodate the varying needs of consumers of
different financial products. 92 Moreover, realizing that a key to the successful operation of
such a single regulator is the maintenance of clear and open lines of communication,
NewRO plans to incorporate formal mechanisms to promote open internal communica-
tions, as well as non-structural mechanisms, including cross-functional staff training and
rotations.93
The regulatory functions to be undertaken by NewRO are categorized under five
broad headings:94
(i) policy formation and review;
(ii) authorization of firms and vetting and registration of
individuals;
(iii) investigations, enforcement, and discipline;
(iv) relations with consumers and the public; and
(v) supervision.
The organization of NewRO will largely mirror these five functional areas, though supervi-
sion will be divided into units according to types of business. These individual supervision.,
units will be responsible for both prudential supervision and conduct of business regula-.
tion. The idea is that combining these two duties will enhance efficiency and effectiveness,.
since some aspects of supervision (namely, reviews of the quality of the management and
of systems and controls) has relevance to both prudential and conduct of business risks.
A point of interest is the manner in which NewRO plans to handle the supervision of
financial conglomerates. The intention is to build upon the "lead supervisor" concept
already used to a certain extent. Accordingly, individual lines of business will be supervised
by function, but a lead supervisor will be named to set the supervisory program and to
coordinate the relationships among members of the group-and with international regu-
latory bodies as well. In situations where the financial conglomerate has a dominant type
of business, the lead supervisor will simply be the unit covering that area. However, the
choice of the lead supervisor will have to be made on a case-by-case basis where the busi-
ness activities of the conglomerate are more complex.9 5
91. REPORT TO THE CHANCELLOR, supra note 86, at para. 1.
92. Id. at para. 3.
93. Id. at para. 21.
94. Id. at para. 5.
95. Id. at para. 17.
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The investigative and enforcement functions of NewRO are to be delegated to a single
unit that will handle cases from all the various areas of supervision.96 As mentioned above, it
is in this area where regulatory economies of scale can be most important, and it seems that
the organization of NewRO appreciates the efficiencies that can be realized in this respect.
Finally, NewRO, though it will exist as a separate agency accountable only to the gov-
ernment and Parliament, will have a working external relationship with the Bank of
England. Evidencing this relationship will be a Memorandum of Understanding, drawn up
by the Treasury, NewRO, and the Bank outlining the respective responsibilities among the
organizations. 97
VI. The Core Principles and the Basic Pillars of a Regulatory and
Supervisory System.
Once policy-makers have determined the basic shape of the regulatory authority, i.e.,
who will regulate (the central banks or a separate authority or authorities) and what will be
regulated (anything on the range from only banking to all financial activities of financial
institutions), the focus must then turn to how such regulation and supervision will be
achieved. In this regard, the Basle Principles and their explications within the Compendium
are of considerable usefulness, at least in the setting of broad standards and methodologies.
The basic pillars of an effective regulatory and supervisory system can be seen on five levels:
adequate entry requirements, minimum prudential regulations, effective ongoing supervi-
sion, adequate enforcement mechanisms, and channels for international cooperation.
At an initial level, there must be an adequate licensing process. Licensing allowsthe
regulatory authority to control and define the number and types of institutions that it is
responsible for. Permissible activities of institutions and the licensing requirements need to
be clearly defined. 98 Further, the licensing authority must have the right to set criteria and
reject applications, assessing at a minimum, ownership structure, qualifications of direc-
tors and management, operating plans and controls, and projected capital base.99 In addi-
tion, in case of an application from a foreign financial institution, approval should be
sought from the home regulatory authority.
Beyond initial entry requirements, the authorities must be able to monitor and reject
transfers of ownership or major acquisitions.' 00 Such controls are essential to maintaining
the initial level of standards set for entry and to maintain an accurate picture of the institu-
tional population. Despite this basic level of control, however, financial innovation is vital to
economic success and should not be unduly deterred through bureaucratic impediments.
At a second level, prudential regulations and requirements are necessary as a precur-
sor to successful ongoing supervision. Today, financial regulation is turning increasingly to
a process of risk based supervision.and therefore the authority must establish require-
ments appropriate to the risks that banks are likely to face in their ongoing operations. It is
96. Id. at para. 12.
97. Id. at para. 30.
98. Basle Core Principles, supra note 17, Principle 2, at 4.
99. Id. Principle 3, at 4.
100. Id. Principles 4 and 5, at 4.
101. SeeNorton, supra note 15.
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at this level that the Basle Committee has historically been very accurate and, arguably,
effective in establishing standards and methodologies.10 '
Within the context of supervision, prudent minimum capital adequacy requirements
are essential, 102 not only from a regulatory viewpoint, but more importantly from the
standpoint of international investors. Beyond minimum capital requirements, supervisors
need to be able to evaluate policies, practices, and procedures related to the granting of
loans, the making of investments, and the ongoing management of both (the process of
monitoring credit risk). 103 While obviously supervisors cannot and should not subject
each individual decision to scrutiny, they should make sure that banks have in place pru-
dent written policies for such activities and internal information capabilities, as well as fol-
low concentration limits to single borrowers and prohibitions against connected lend-
ing. 104 In addition, banks must establish and implement policies and procedures for asset
quality maintenance and provisioning.105
In addition to credit risk, supervisors must ensure that banks have adequate policies
and procedures to deal with country risk, 106 market risk, 10 7 and other risks such as inter-
est rate and liquidity risk.10 8 Finally, banks must establish procedures and policies to deal
with operational risks, such as fraud, corruption, and money-laundering, including inter-
nal controls and "know-your-customer" rules. 109
At a third level, once prudential requirements are established, supervisors must have
clear and effective methodologies for ongoing supervisory efforts. Such a system should
include both on-site and off-site supervision, 110 along with regular contact with bank man-
agement and understanding of each institution's operations' 11 as part of a comprehensive
means of gathering and analyzing information from institutions on both a solo and a con-
solidated basis. 112 Beyond information gathering and monitoring, supervisors must have a
means of independent validation of information, either through on-site examination or the
use of effective and accountable external auditors.11 3 Finally, if financial groups are allowed,
supervisors must be able to supervise such banking groups on a consolidated basis. 114 As one
significant aspect of this process, banks must maintain and publish fair and accurate finan-
cial statements in accordance with consistent accounting policies.115
At a fourth level, banking supervisors must be able to enforce prudential regulations
and cause banks to undertake appropriate'corrective action, up to and including de-autho-
102. Basle Core Principles, supra note 17, Principle 6, at 5.
103. Id. Principle 7, at 5.
104. Id. Principle 8, at 5.
105. Id. Principles 9 and 10, at 5.
106. Id. Principle 11, at 5.
107. Id. Principle 12, at 5.
108. Id. Principle 13, at 5-6.
109. Id. Principles 14 and 15, at 6.
110. Id. Principle 16, at 6.
111. Id. Principle 17, at 6.
112. Id. Principle 18, at 6.
113. Id. Principle 19, at 6.
114. Id. Principle 20, at 6.
115. Id. Principle 21, at 6-7.
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rization and liquidation. 116 Internationally, there is an increasing focus on varying levels of
supervision for institutions based on their financial health under the doctrine of "prompt
corrective action" developed in the United States following the S&L crisis in the 1980s.117
If a supervisory authority is not given powers to implement its authority, then its effective-
ness is effectively eliminated. Further, these powers should be clear and non-discretionary
to the extent possible. 11 8
Finally, banking supervisors must be able to operate in the international arena for
financial institutions that continues to develop worldwide. Home supervisors of interna-
tionally active financial institutions should practice global consolidated supervision,1 9 at
a minimum establishing contact and information exchanges with other relevant foreign
supervisory authorities.120 In terms of foreign banks operating domestically, such institu-
tions must follow the same standards required for domestic institutions, and supervisors
must be able to share information with the institutions' home supervisors in order to
ensure effective supervision. 121
VII. Conclusions: Implications for Banking Regulation and Supervision
in Emerging Markets.
Admittedly, this chapter has revolved around the experiences of developed countries
in struggling with the issues concerning financial regulatory structure-in terms of both
developed countries individually and speaking as a group through the Basle Core
Principles. Developing countries, however, can learn from the experiences (and mistakes)
of developed countries, and, accordingly, the relevance of this chapter transcends any such
distinction. With that said, the author would like to address briefly certain issues that could
be particular to developing countries.
First, developing countries are likely to lack the abundance of resources and/or exper-
tise that their developed brethren possess. As mentioned earlier, this factor could, for
example, play a part in a decision of whether to separate the central bank from bank
supervisory functions.
Second, the level of development of the financial markets and/or institutions in devel-
oping countries could be different than their counterparts in developed countries. As a
result, the "functional versus institutional" debate may be premature if the financial institu-
tions in these countries still abide to a large degree on their traditional definitions.
Furthermore, in countries with relatively small financial markets, the chances for a large and
powerful financial regulatory bureaucracy, which will jealously protect its regulatory "turf,"
may be less-and, as a result, the chances for real and quick restructuring could be better.
116. Id. Principle 22, at 7.
117. SeeNORTON & WHITLEY, supra note 48, §§ 3.11[8],5.08[3] [a] (1996).
118. See contribution of R. Helfert, former U.S. Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC)
Chairman, for the 1997 SELA Caracas Conference Proceedings, supra note 1.
119. Basle Core Principles, supra note 17, Principle 23, at 7.
120. Id. Principle 25, at 7.
121. Id.
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Lastly, I would like to conclude by saying that there is no "right" regulatory structure
for financial services. Different histories, cultures, capabilities, etc., will dictate the shape
and character that a regulatory structure must necessarily take. A framework that has been
proven to be effective in one country might have disastrous results if attempted to be
adopted wholesale in another country.
The recent experience in the United Kingdom demonstrates that there is always room
for improvement and/or innovation, and that financial regulation, similar to the financial
markets for which the financial regulators/supervisors have oversight responsibilities, can
never be considered to be a static endeavor.
